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Re: st: Quantal Response Equilibrium with Stata


From   Massimo Finocchiaro Castro <cmfino@unict.it>
To   statalist@hsphsun2.harvard.edu
Subject   Re: st: Quantal Response Equilibrium with Stata
Date   Mon, 03 Dec 2007 13:13:07 +0000

As promptly suggested (thanks Carlo!), I better add some more information regarding the Quantal Response Equilibrium application I am dealing with.

I run an experiment where participants, divided into pairs, allocates a given endowment between two possible investments. One player in each pair is a virtual player (the computer faced by the human player). This procedure is repeated 10 times by 94 human players.

To study the role of uncertainty on voluntary contributions to public goods. I run two different treatments. In the first treatment, human players know that the virtual player will choose its contributions between two possible values with equal probability (50%-50%) but he does not know the chosen value until he has made his decision.

In the second treatment, the only difference with the previous treatment is that human players do not know the probability distribution of the computer's decisions. Uncertainty (or better ambiguity) is introduced through the Ellsberg's urn.

The Quantal Response Equilibrium should be able to tell me whether the deviations from the Nash Equilibrium are higher in the ambiguous treatment compared with the risky treatment (equal probability).

Hope this makes my problem a little clearer than before.

Massimo






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