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R: st: Quantal Response Equilibrium with Stata

From   "Carlo Lazzaro" <[email protected]>
To   <[email protected]>
Subject   R: st: Quantal Response Equilibrium with Stata
Date   Mon, 3 Dec 2007 14:02:48 +0100

Dear Massimo,

even though I am a (health)economist, my knowledge of game theory is not
enough well-established to address the issue you clearly laid out.

However, provided You have not tried yet, I would suggest you to search for
a hopeful prompt solution on Google or on the Statalist archive. Perhaps
some Statalister (or some Statauser) has encountered (and solved) the same
issue in the past.

Sorry I cannot be more helpful.

Kind Regards,


-----Messaggio originale-----
Da: [email protected]
[mailto:[email protected]] Per conto di Massimo
Finocchiaro Castro
Inviato: luned´┐Ż 3 dicembre 2007 14.13
A: [email protected]
Oggetto: Re: st: Quantal Response Equilibrium with Stata

As promptly suggested (thanks Carlo!), I better add some more 
information regarding the Quantal Response Equilibrium application I am 
dealing with.

I run an experiment where participants, divided into pairs, allocates a 
given endowment between two possible investments. One player in each 
pair is a virtual player (the computer faced by the human player). This 
procedure is repeated 10 times by 94 human players.

To study the role of uncertainty on voluntary contributions to public 
goods. I run two different treatments. In the first treatment, human 
players know that the  virtual player will choose its contributions 
between two possible values with equal probability (50%-50%) but he does 
not know the chosen value until he has made his decision.

In the second treatment, the only difference with the previous treatment 
is that human players do not know the probability distribution of the 
computer's decisions. Uncertainty (or better ambiguity) is introduced 
through the Ellsberg's urn.

The Quantal Response Equilibrium should be able to tell me whether the 
deviations from the Nash Equilibrium are higher in the ambiguous 
treatment compared with the risky treatment (equal probability).

Hope this makes my problem a little clearer than before.


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