#### Nature of Inequality and Allocation of Talents: Some Empirical Evidence

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
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## Outline

- Background / Motivation
- Stylized Facts
- Hypotheses
- Overview of the empirical model and main results
- Data and methodology
- Results and conclusion

- Natkhov and Polishchuk (2019), Kyklos: talent allocation explained by the quality of institutions
  - Murphy et al. (1991), *QJE*:
    - Education in sciences, an investment specific to productive activities
    - Legal education, helpful in unproductive activities such as redistribution ("legal human capital", Hadfield, 2007)
    - (Number of law students characterize the nature of an economy:
      - Laband et al. 1988, *Public Choice*)



Natkhov and Polishchuk (2019): positive relationship between the quality of institutions and the graduation in sciences, and a negative one between institutional quality and the graduation in law

- <u>Related literature:</u>
  - Ebeke et al. (2015): graduation of university students in law / business / social sciences; AND engineering and technical sciences, is affected by resource wealth and the quality of national institutions
    - Massive resource sector increases the attractiveness of rentseeking activities discouraging to invest in STEM
  - Alexeev et al. (2018): enrolment of over a million Russian university students:
    - Students more responsive to the quality of regional institutions when deciding to seek education in STEM

- Effect of income inequality in talent allocation:
  - Natkhov and Polishchuk (2019):
    - Control variable, high level of inequality affect career choices in law (positive relation)
    - When institutions are included, effect of income inequality become insignificant
    - Acemoglu and Robinson (2012): "rent-seeking institutions" ("weak institutions") benefiting privileged elites at the expense of the rest of society associated with high income inequality
    - Would that suggest that inequalities driven by rent-seeking institutions affect career choice in law ???
  - Our argument in this paper:
    - Income inequality when conditioned by institutions affect the allocation of talents in productive or unproductive field

#### • Our objective:

- Analyse the effects of the nature of income inequality on the allocation of talents
- The nature of income inequality is driven by the nature of institutions:
  - Facchini et al. (2023), *EJPE*: the nature of income inequality affect the growth-inequality debate:
    - "Profit-seeking institutions" (productive inequalities) : positive relation
    - "Rent-seeking institutions" (unproductive inequalities): negative relation
- Why the type of inequality matters ? Personal enrichment:
  - Through rent-seeking activities: need to acquire legal skills
  - Through profit-seeking activities: need to acquire scientific and entrepreneurial skills

- Rent-seeking society generate rent opportunities, fueling the demand for legal competences and skills:
  - Rent-seeking society is full of public sector jobs
  - Jobs provided by State monopolies in the area of the judiciary, higher education, diplomacy and military etc.
  - Rent-seeking society displays a high level of regulated economic activities
    - Develop skills to know the different tax exemptions offered by the law
    - Legal skills to optimize your tax level
    - Need to know all the subsidy schemes offered by the government to create your business and/or for hiring

- Free-market society with "profit-seeking" ("good") institutions, legal skills are useless:
  - Reward risk taking behaviors and provide a lower job protection for employees
  - Young talents decide to embrace an entrepreneurial journey since the status of employee is less protected
  - Welfare state is less developed, and the labor law does not favor employees that much



Entrepreneurship become a credible career option fueling students' enrolment in business studies, sciences and engineering (Gibb 2011; Divert 1982)

#### Measuring the nature income inequality?

Capturing institutional dimension:

- Facchini et al. (2023) recent contribution:

- The Institutions Productivity Indicator (IP):
  - Derived by Baumol (1990,2004)
  - Captures the predominance of profit-seeking institutions over rent-seeking ones

 $IP = \frac{Property Rights}{10 - Rigorous and Impartial Public Administration}$ 

# Measuring the nature income inequality?

- IP captures the institutional environment that drives the nature of inequalities
- Nature of inequalities affect allocation of talents
  - Countries with high IP score: productive inequalities favor talents allocation in Sciences and Engineering
  - Countries with low IP score: unproductive inequalities favors talents allocation in Law
  - Nature of inequalities is an important driver of talents allocation

#### Stylized Facts: Countries with Low IP Score

Difference in law graduates and science graduates




Figure 1: Income inequality and allocation of talents

### Hypotheses

- Hypothesis 1: In countries in which institutions are productive, income inequality favors enrollment in sciences university degrees
- Hypothesis 2: In countries in which institutions are unproductive income inequality favors enrollment in law university degrees

#### Model's Overview / Main Results

- We empirically test our hypothesis using panel data covering the 2000-2020 for 81 countries with different income level
- We find a positive relationship between productive inequalities and talents allocation in productive fields (Science and Engineering)

#### **Data and Methodology**

• Two ways FE and system-GMM:

Following Natkhov and Polishchuk (2019), we estimate equation 1:

Productive activities<sub>it</sub> =  $\alpha + \beta_1 Gini_{it} + \beta_2 IP_{it} * Gini_{it} + \beta_3 IP_{it}$ 

$$+ \beta_4 \quad X_{it} + \mu_i + \sigma_t + \varepsilon \tag{1}$$

- Where Productive activities<sub>it</sub> is share of those majoring in sciences
- The nature of income inequality measured by IP it \* Giniit.
- X is a vector of socio-economic and demographic control variables for country i at time t
- $\mu_i$ ,  $\sigma_t$  are country and period fixed effects and  $\varepsilon$  is the error term

#### **Data and Methodology**

- Data
  - -UNESCO Institute of Statistics
    - Information on the number of graduates in tertiary education for 23 educational programs in 102 countries
  - -WDI
  - World Bank

### **Data and Methodology**

- Socio-economic and demographic control variables
  - GDP per capita (expected +)
  - School enrollment in tertiary education (expected +)
  - GDP structure (share of service in GDP):
    - (expected for sciences and expected + for law)
  - R&D expenditures (expected +)
  - Population (market size) (expected +)

#### Table 1

#### FE and GMM regressions for share in science graduates

	FE	GMM	GMM
	1	2	3
Log IP	-0.398**	-2.668***	-0.371***
	(-2.074)	(-7.734)	(-2.791)
Log Gini	-0.411***	-0.801***	-0.143**
	(-3.652)	(-5.513)	(-2.112)
Interaction IP . Gini	<mark>0.103*</mark>	0.771***	0.0932**

#### Table 1

FE and GMM regressions for share in science graduates

	FE		GMM	GMM
Log GDP per capita				
growth				0.00520***
				(4.189)
Log school_enrollment				
tertiary				0.00323
				(0.0779)
Log service (% GDP)				-0.152*
				(-1.786)
R&D				0.131***
				(15.73)
Log population				0.0508***
				(5,836)
Constant	4.565***		5.903***	3.276***
	(11.34)		(11.48)	(8.323)
Observations		679	679	441
Number of countries		72	72	62
R-squared	0.028			
Hansen			0.143	0.307

#### Table 2: FE and GMM regressions:

Difference between shares of law school and science graduates

	FE	GMM	GMM
	1	2	3
Log IP	0.443	21.67***	31.03***
	(0.350)	(49.59)	(19.87)
Log Gini	2.089***	5.147***	4.656***
	(3.286)	(15.61)	(10.19)
Interaction IP. Gini	-0.0228	-6.273***	-8.897***

#### Table 2: FE and GMM regressions:

Difference between shares of law school and science graduates

	1	s of him school and schence graduates			
	FE	GMM	GMM		
	1	2	3		
Log GDP per capita					
growth	-5.721**		0.0909***		
	(-2,499)		(25.67)		
Log school_enrollment					
tertiary			0.892***		
			(5.066)		
Log service (% GDP)			1.068***		
			(2.733)		
R&D			-1.601***		
			(-22.55)		
Log population			-0.0396		
			(-1.138)		
Constant		-16.11***	-20.66***		
		(-13.46)	(-7.038)		
Observations	456	456	294		
Number of countries	59	59	49		
R-squared	0.053				
Hansen		0.555	0.556		

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Variable	Mean	S.D	Min	Max
Difference between the shares of law				
school (graduates as a proxy for the				
allocation of talent to redistribution)				
and science graduates	2.11	1.06	-3.44	3.86
Institutions' Productivity indicator	0.85	1.27	-1.13	4.83
GINI	3.55	0.21	3.14	4.17
GDP per capita growth	0.96	0.96	-4.79	3.49
Log school_enrollement tertiary	3.60	0.91	-0.25	4.96
Log service (% GDP)	4.00	0.192	3.07	4.38
R&D	1.06	0.91	0.01	4.79
Population	16.38	1.53	12.54	21.05

### Conclusion

- Productive inequalities affect talents allocation in productive fields in sciences and engineering
- Our results are in line with Natkhov and Polishchuk (2019) but they go beyond
  - More than the quality of institutions:
    - The nature of income inequalities matters
    - The way to get wealthy matters

### **THANK YOU !**