

# The Longitudinal Effects of Disability Types on Income and Employment

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## Introduction: Economic Consequences of Disability

Disability is primary income risk: impairs ability to perform tasks in work and daily life

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- ▶ disabilities are dynamic in nature

## Research Agenda and Approach

Analyze heterogeneity in longitudinal effects of disability types on the level and composition of personal income

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Interaction-weighted estimator of (Sun and Abraham 2020)

- ▶ dynamic design: point estimate for each of the ten years after onset
- ▶ implemented with `eventstudyinteract`

# Contributions

## 1. longitudinal effects of health shocks

- ▶ *Stephens (2001), Charles (2003), Singleton (2012), Meyer and Mok (2019), Humlum, Munch, Plato (2023), Collischon, Hiesinger, and Pohlan (2023)*
- ▶ analyze type based heterogeneity in unified framework using rich administrative data

## 2. income shocks and partial insurance

- ▶ *Blundell, Graber, Mogstad (2015), Blundell, Pistaferri, Saporta-Eksten (2016), Autor, Køstal, Mogstad, Setzler (2019), Fadlon and Nielsen (2021)*
- ▶ specificity of source of shocks motivated by taks-based human capital model

## 3. empirical approach using recent estimator

- ▶ robust to bias in two-way fixed effects estimation with heterogeneous treatment effects and variation in timing
- ▶ *Borusyak and Jaravel (2017), De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille (2020), Goodman-Bacon (2021), Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) Sun and Abraham (2021), Imai and Kim (2021), Baker et al (2022)*

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Biennial panel survey of Canadian households aged 15 and older (2012-2018)

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  - ▶ market income: wages, salaries, and commissions, labor market participation, other employment income
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  - ▶ pre- and post-tax total income, total non-taxable income, total family income

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**Sample:** ever- and never-disabled in the age range 22-61, living in Canadian provinces, whose onset occurred in age range 23-56

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Self-reported frequency of limitation

- ▶ *“How often does [this difficulty ...] limit your daily activities?”*

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Mutually exclusive type of activity limitation

- ▶ **aggregate physical:**

- ▶ kinetic ability (mobility, flexibility, dexterity)
- ▶ exclusively pain

- ▶ **mental-cognitive:**

- ▶ cognitive functioning: learning, memory, attention
- ▶ exclusively mental-health: anxiety, depression, emotional, psychological

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Age of disability onset

- ▶ *“at what age did you first start having difficulty or activity limitation?”*



## Empirical Framework: Interaction-Weighted estimator

Define cohort-average treatment on the treated, for onset of disability type  $g$

$$CATT_{e,l}^g = E[Y_{i,e+l}^g - Y_{i,e+l}^\infty | E_i = e]$$

- ▶  $E_i$  is the year,  $t$ , of disability onset

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Treatment effect of for disability type  $g$ : weighted average of  $CATT_{e,l}^g$

$$v_l^g = \sum_e CATT_{e,l}^g \cdot Pr\{E_i = e | E_i \in [-l, T - l]\}$$

- ▶ weights are shares of cohorts experiencing at least  $l$  periods relative to onset
- ▶ separating CATT's removes any "illegal comparisons"

## Empirical Framework: Interaction-Weighted estimator

Step 1: estimate cohort average treatment effects using `reghdfe` (Correia 2016)

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \beta X_{it} + \sum_e \sum_l \delta_{l,e}^g A_{l,it}^g A_{e,i}^g + \epsilon_{it}$$

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- ▶  $\alpha_i$  and  $\gamma_t$  control for individual-fixed and time-fixed unobserved heterogeneity
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- ▶  $\epsilon_{it}$  serially correlated error

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Step 3: take weighted (step 2) sum of  $\delta_{e,l}$ 's (step 1)

$$\hat{\nu}_l^g = \sum_e \hat{\delta}_{e,l} \hat{P}_R\{E_i = e | E_i \in [-l, T - l]\}$$

# Identifying assumptions

Causal inference relies on never-disabled being counterfactual for no disability onset

## 1. conditional parallel trends in pre-onset outcomes

- ▶ quadratic age and time trend interacted with education, family composition, sex
- ▶ additional linearity assumption in step 1

## 2. no anticipation in effects

- ▶ can shift treatment window to accommodate leading effects
- ▶ limitation: anticipation, progression of disability, or measurement error?

## 3. IW estimator robust to treatment heterogeneity by cohort

Under 1-3,  $\hat{v}_l^g$  recovers an average effect of onset of disability type  $g$ ,  $l$  periods relative to onset.

# Empirical Results 1: Components of Market Income

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Figure: Aggregate Physical




# Empirical Results 1: Components of Market Income

Figure: Mental-Cognitive




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
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
Figure: Kinetic Ability






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Figure: Exclusively Pain




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Figure: Exclusively Mental Health



# Empirical Results


Figure: Cognitive Functioning



## Empirical Results 2: Government Transfers


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Figure: Aggregate Physical




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Figure: Mental-Cognitive




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Figure: Kinetic Ability



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
Figure: Exclusively Pain






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Figure: Exclusively Mental Health




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

# Empirical Results 3: Smoothing Mechanisms

Figure: Before Tax Total Income




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
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Figure: Total Non-taxable income





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Figure: Family Total Income





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
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
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Figure: Total Nontaxable Income





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Figure: Total Family Income





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
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
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# Conclusion

## Market Income:

- ▶ level effects of mental-cognitive  $>$  physical
  - ▶ earnings loss driven by extensive margin for physical, combination for mental-cognitive
- ▶ within physical: effects driven by limitations to kinetic ability
- ▶ within cognitive: large magnitude for both

## Government Transfers:

- ▶ similar in total government transfers between physical and mental-cognitive
  - ▶ entirely from disability relevant transfers for physical, only long run for mental-cognitive
  - ▶ within physical: the rise in transfers driven by kinetic ability
  - ▶ within cognitive: insurance gaps for mental health

## Other smoothing mechanisms

- ▶ non-taxable income main insurance for aggregate physical, effect of mental-cognitive buffered by tax system

THANK YOU!!



# Conceptual framework: task-specific human capital

## Workers

- ▶  $s_t$  : k dimension skill portfolio vector
  - ▶  $s_t^j \in \mathbb{R}$  represents proficiency in productive skills of type j
- ▶  $d_t$  : k dimension extent of disability vector
  - ▶  $d_t^j \in [0, 1]$  - extent of limitation for skills of type j

## Occupations

- ▶  $x_t$  : k-dimensions bundle of skill requirements
  - ▶  $x_t^j \in \mathbb{R}$  represents complexity/ intensity of use of skills in production
  - ▶ derived from set of task requirements of an occupation

## Conceptual framework: wage determination function

Workers hourly wage equals their marginal value product:

$$w_t = \pi(x_t)q(x_t, s_t)\exp(\eta_t).$$

- ▶  $\pi(x_t)$ : is market pricing of output produced by tasks,  $x_t$
- ▶  $q(x_t, s_t)$ : productivity of worker with skill  $s_t$  at job with task complexity  $x_t$ 
  - ▶  $\ln q(x_t, s_t) = \theta'(x_t)s_t$ , where  $\theta'(x_t)$  is k-dim vector of implicit skill prices
- ▶  $\eta_t$  : I.I.D productivity shocks

Skills matter for productivity as long as you can use them

- ▶ define  $h_t = s_t \cdot x_t$  to be a workers "effective skills"

Disability induced mismatch

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta w &= (q(s_t, x_t) - q(h_t, x_t))\pi(x_t)\exp(\eta_t) \\ &= \theta'(x_t)(s_t - h_t)\pi(x_t)\exp(\eta_t)\end{aligned}$$

## Conceptual framework: dynamic effects of disability

To illustrate, consider simple skill accumulation process

$$s_{t+1} = Ds_t + A_1x_t + A_2d_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$

- ▶  $D$ : diagonal elements are depreciation
- ▶  $A_1$ : "learning by doing,"
  - ▶ diagonal : higher intensity of task  $x_t^j$ , higher accumulation of these skills
  - ▶ off-diagonal : complementarities between tasks and other skills (e.g., healthy body results in health mind)
- ▶  $A_2$ : impact of disability on next period skills
  - ▶ diagonal : direct effect limitation in one dimension
  - ▶ off-diagonal : limitation in some dimensions, may influence skill accumulation in another

Repeatedly substitute previous periods skills

$$s_{t+1} = D^{t-n}s_{t-n} + \sum_{j=0}^n D^j A_1 x_{t-j} + \sum_{j=0}^n D^j A_2 d_j + \sum_{j=0}^n D^j \epsilon_{t-n+1}$$

## Empirical Framework: Treatment effect of interest

We observe the following post-treatment

$$Y_{i,t} = Y_{i,t}^{E_i} = Y_{i,t}^{\infty} + \sum_{0 \leq e \leq T} (Y_{i,t}^e - Y_{i,t}^{\infty}) \mathbb{I}\{E_i = e\}$$

- ▶  $e$  is treatment cohort,  $\mathbb{I}\{E_i = e\}$  is indicator for  $i$  in treatment cohort  $e$
- ▶  $Y_{i,e+l}$  is outcome  $l$  periods relative to treatment, if  $i$  first treated in period  $e$
- ▶  $Y_{i,e+l}^{\infty}$  is outcome  $l$  periods relative to treatment, if  $i$  wasn't treated in period  $e$

Define cohort-average treatment on the treated,  $k$  periods relative to treatment

$$CATT_{e,l} = E(Y_{i,e+l} - Y_{i,e+l}^{\infty}) | E_i = e$$

- ▶ average treatment effect  $l$  periods from first treatment for cohort first treated at  $e$
- ▶ note: timing in terms of  $l$ , instead of  $t$ .

## Intuition of contamination

Workhorse estimator for dynamic treatment effects: Two-way fixed effects

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \sum_l \delta_l A_{l,i,t} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

- ▶  $A_{l,i,t}$  an indicator for  $k$  periods relative to  $i$ 's initial treatment
- ▶  $\delta_k$  are dynamic treatment effects of interest

Sun and Abraham (2020) show  $\delta_k$  is a weighted sum of  $CATT_{e,l}$  as well as  $CATT_{e,l'}$  from other relative periods (and even excluded periods)

- ▶ *why?* with staggered treatment timing, earlier treatment cohorts compared to later treatment cohorts
- ▶ *issue?* If weights  $w_{e,k'}$  are non-zero, then effects from other relative periods may contaminate interpretation of  $\delta_k$
- ▶ *solution?* Separately estimate all  $CATT_{e,l}$ 's, then take a specific weighted average to recover treatment effect of interest

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# Self-reported disability and concerns

## Subjectivity in extent of health

- ▶ any positive limitations to a specified activity, and abstracts from the degree of impairment

## State dependent reporting: justification bias

- ▶ **physical:** narrow the scope of justification bias to be anchored to the activities in question

*“How often are you limited walking on a flat surface for 20 minutes”*

- ▶ **cognitive:** base the existence of a limiting condition to the diagnosis of a medical professional

*“Has a doctor or medical professional ever said you have a learning disability”*

- ▶ **mental-health:** frame limitations related to mental health with specific examples of diagnoses

*“Do you have an emotional or psychological condition ... such as anxiety, depression, bipolar disorder, etc..”*

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