A Simple, Graphical Procedure for Comparing Multiple Treatments

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- When comparing multiple treatments, we want to know:
 - (A) Whether or not each treatment effect is different from zero
 - (B) Whether or not each treatment effect is different from all others
- With k treatments, this involves making a total of

$$\underbrace{k}_{(A)} + \underbrace{\binom{k}{2}}_{(B)} = \binom{k+1}{2}$$

unique comparisons (e.g., with 4 treatments, there are a total of 10 comparisons)

• We consider the following regression model:

$$Y_t = \beta_0 \text{CONTROL}_t + \sum_{i=1}^k \beta_i \text{TREAT}_{i,t} + \mathbf{Z}'_t \delta + U_t$$

• The (average) treatment effect of the *i*th treatment is

$$\alpha_i \equiv \beta_i - \beta_0, \qquad i = 1, \dots, k,$$

so we want to test

(A) $\alpha_i = 0$ ($\Leftrightarrow \beta_i = \beta_0$), for each $i \in \{1, ..., k\}$ (B) $\alpha_i = \alpha_j$ ($\Leftrightarrow \beta_i = \beta_j$), for each unique pair $(i, j) \in \{1, ..., k\}^2$

or, more simply,

 $\left[egin{array}{cc} eta_i=eta_j, & ext{ for each unique pair }(i,j)\in\{0,1,\ldots,k\}^2 \end{array}
ight]$

• NOTE: This is very different from a single joint test:

$$\beta_0 = \ldots = \beta_k$$

(the alternative here is uninformative)

Simple Example: Teacher Incentives

- Field experiment from Muralidharan & Sundararaman (2011)
- Considers the effects of k = 2 teacher incentive pay treatments:
 - Incentives based on test scores of the teacher's own students
 - Incentives based on test scores of all students in a teacher's school
- The effects of these interventions are compared to test scores of students in similar schools (the control group)
- Z_t includes 49 county dummies and the pre-treatment test score
- Standard errors are clustered by school (we use wild cluster bootstrap when applying our procedure below)
- We focus on combined (math and language) test scores; there are a total of 29,760 obs.

Any effect of individual incentive treatment?

Test
$$\alpha_1 = 0 \iff \beta_1 = \beta_0$$
)

- T-stat: 4.84 $(p_{asy} = 1.298 \times 10^{-6})$
- Any effect of group incentive treatment?

Test
$$\alpha_2 = 0 \iff \beta_2 = \beta_0$$
)

T-stat: 2.70
$$(p_{asy} = 0.007)$$

Any difference between individual incentive and group incentive?


Test
$$\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 \iff \beta_1 = \beta_2$$

T-stat: 1.91 $(p_{asy} = 0.056)$

- Our approach to this multiple testing problem is to seek to control the **familywise error rate** (FWER): the probability of finding <u>at least</u> one spurious difference (Type I error) between the parameters
- It is straightforward to modify our procedure to target control of a less stringent error rate such as the false discovery rate (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995)

FWER Error Rates

(A) k independent T-tests at 5% level (B) $\binom{k}{2}$ independent T-tests at 5% level



- Utilize procedure of Bennett & Thompson (2017, JASA), which can be seen as a resampling-based generalization of Tukey's (1953) procedure
- The approach is to plot each parameter estimate $\hat{\beta}_{n,i}$ together with its corresponding **uncertainty interval**,

$$[L_{n,i}(\gamma), U_{n,i}(\gamma)] = \left[\hat{\beta}_{n,i} \pm \gamma \times \operatorname{se}\left(\hat{\beta}_{n,i}\right)\right],$$

where γ is chosen to control the FWER

• We infer that $\beta_i > \beta_j$ if $L_{n,i} > U_{n,j}$

- Comparisons based on the non-overlap of <u>confidence</u> intervals are not reliable:
- With a single comparison (k = 1), non-overlap of Cl's lead to serve under-rejection
- When the number of comparisons grows, non-overlap of CI's lead to over-rejection

• The "ideal" choice of γ is the smallest value satisfying

$$\operatorname{Prob}_{P}\left\{\max L_{n,i}(\gamma) > \min U_{n,i}(\gamma)\right\} \leq \alpha$$

Probability of at least one non-overlap

when all k parameters are equal

• This choice is infeasible since P is unknown


 $\bullet\,$ We choose γ to satisfy the bootstrap analogue of the above condition:

$$\operatorname{Prob}_{\hat{P}_n}\left\{\max L_{n,i}^*(\gamma) > \min U_{n,i}^*(\gamma)\right\} \leq \alpha,$$

where

$$\left[L_{n,i}^{*}(\gamma), U_{n,i}^{*}(\gamma)\right] = \left[\left(\hat{\beta}_{n,i}^{*} - \hat{\beta}_{n,i}\right) \pm \gamma \times \operatorname{se}\left(\hat{\beta}_{n,i}^{*}\right)\right],$$

Teacher Incentives Example: The Overlap Plot



Data-driven choice of γ : 0.497

Plotting Marginal Treatment Effects


- Empirical researchers are typically interested only in the α coefficients (the marginal treatment effects)
- Accordingly, we can plot $\hat{\alpha}_{n,i}$ along with the re-centered uncertainty interval for β_i

$$\left[\underbrace{\hat{\beta}_{\textit{n},i}-\hat{\beta}_{\textit{n},0}}_{\hat{\alpha}_{\textit{n},i}}\pm\gamma\times\mathsf{se}\left(\hat{\beta}_{\textit{n},i}\right)\right]$$

• We also include the re-centered uncertainty interval for β_0

$$\left[\underbrace{\hat{\beta}_{n,0} - \hat{\beta}_{n,0}}_{0} \pm \gamma \times \operatorname{se}\left(\hat{\beta}_{n,0}\right)\right]$$

Teacher Incentives Example: Marginal Treatment Effects



Dotted line corresponds to upper endpoint of re-centered uncertainty interval for $\beta_{\rm 0}$

- Bennett & Thompson show that, under fairly general conditions, the procedure:
 - **1** Bounds the FWER by α asymptotically
 - Is consistent in the sense that the ordering of all parameter pairs are correctly inferred asymptotically
- Simulation evidence in both Bennett & Thompson and Thompson & Webb suggests that the finite sample properties of the procedure are satisfactory

• If the procedure fails to resolve all pairwise comparisons, it may be possible to do so via a global refinement which is analogous to the stepdown procedures of Romano & Wolf (2005) and others

- The above procedure controls the FWER error rate across <u>all pairwise</u> comparisons
- This approach allows for a (potentially complete) <u>ranking</u> of all the treatments:
 - Assuming larger values of outcome variable are "better", one could infer that treatment *i* is the "best" if

$$L_{n,i} > U_{n,j},$$
 for all $j \neq i$

• Similarly, one may be able to identify a "second best" treatment, a "third best" treatment, etc.

- While such a complete ranking may occasionally be of value, interest often centers on identifying only the (first) best treatment
- Specifically, we may only want to know whether or not the treatment effect which is estimated to be the largest is actually statistically distinguishable from the other treatments effects (and zero)
- Such a problem is the focus of **multiple comparisons with the best** procedures
- Here, we follow BT in developing a modification of the basic overlap procedure to focus on this problem

• Let $[1], [2], \ldots, [k+1]$, be the random indices such that

$$\hat{\beta}_{n,[1]} > \hat{\beta}_{n,[2]} > \cdots > \hat{\beta}_{n,[k+1]}$$

- Note that β_[1] is the true value of the parameter which is <u>estimated</u> to be largest, and not necessarily the largest parameter value
- Similarly, $L_{n,[1]}$ is the lower endpoint of the uncertainty interval associated with the largest point estimate, which is not necessarily the largest lower endpoint (the standard error of $\hat{\beta}_{n,[1]}$ might be relatively large)

- Similar to before, we infer that β_[1] is the largest parameter value in the collection if L_{n,[1]} > U_{n,[j]} for all j > 1
- \bullet Our "ideal" choice of γ is the smallest value satisfying

$$\operatorname{Prob}_{P}\left\{L_{n,[1]}(\gamma)>\max_{j\neq 1}U_{n,[j]}(\gamma)
ight\}\leq lpha$$


when all k parameters are equal

• A feasible choice of γ is the smallest value satisfying

$$\mathsf{Prob}_{\hat{P}_n}\left\{L^*_{n,[1]}(\gamma) > \max_{j\neq 1} U^*_{n,[j]}(\gamma)\right\} \leq \alpha$$

• This choice of γ will be (weakly) smaller than the choice resulting from the basic procedure, leading to greater power

Teacher Incentives Example: Modified Overlap Plot



Data-driven choice of γ : 0.316 (compare with 0.497)

- Data comes from field experiment by Karlan & List (2007)
- Experiment was designed to examine the effect of matching grants on charitable giving
- Letters sent out to n = 50,083 previous donors
- $\bullet~1/3$ of letter recipients belonged to control group
- Remaining 2/3 of letter recipients got one of the k = 36 treatments that varied by
 - Matching ratio: 1:1, 2:1, or 3:1
 - Ø Maximum size of matching grant: \$25,000, \$50,000, \$100,000, or none
 - **③** Amount used as illustration: 1, 1.25, or 1.50 imes donor's prev. max.

Charitable Giving Example

