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Merger simulation with Stata

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Introduction



The presentation is based on the academic article *Bjørnerstedt-Verboven, Merger Simulation with Nested Logit Demand – Implementation using Stata, April 2013, Konkurrentverket Working Paper Series*

- Economics of merger (simulation)
- **mergersim** command in Stata
- How and when to apply the program

Economics of merger (simulation)



Product substitution matters

- Two main concepts of merger investigations:
 - Unilateral effects: unilateral incentive to increase prices
 - Coordinated effects: coordination more likely after merger → higher prices
- Differentiated products: diversion of sales from Company A to Company B is internalized as a result of the merger → looking at cross-price elasticities of products of Company A and Company B
- Merger simulation:
 - Applies a model on the industry and the competition
 - Calibrates pre-merger prices
 - Calibrates post-merger prices (which, in the absence of efficiencies, is always higher in markets of substitute products)
 - Firms compete by setting prices
 - Nash-equilibrium: each firm maximises profits given prices set by others
 - Need an assumption on demand function → strongest

Björnerstedt-Verboven model




Merger simulation with nested logit demand

- Demand is modelled with logit approximation: calculating choice probabilities of consumers for each choice available.
- Nested: consumer selects a product group first, then a specific product. This allows the model to calculate with cross-price elasticities greater between products of the same group (closer to reality)
- The model derives consumer choices based on random utility maximization then calculates the aggregate demand system for all products.

Merger simulation with Stata



Merger simulation with nested logit demand

- 
1. `mergersim init`
 - run regression estimation (nested logit)
 2. `mergersim market` (post-estimation command)
 3. `mergersim simulate` (post-estimation command)

Merger simulation I. (initialization)



Three steps of merger simulation (1 of 3)

```
mergersim init [if] [in], marketsize(varname) {quantity(varname) | price(varname) | revenue(varname)} [init_options]
```

→ nests(varlist) firm(varname) unitdemand / cesdemand

```
. mergersim init, nests(segment domestic) price(princ) quantity(qu) marketsize(MSIZE) firm(firm)
```

```
MERGERSIM: Merger Simulation Program  
Version 1.0, Revision: 218
```

```
Unit demand two-level nested logit
```

Depvar	Price	Group shares
M_ls	princ	M_lsjh M_lshg

```
Variables generated: M_ls M_lsjh M_lshg
```



Merger simulation I. (initialization)

Three steps of merger simulation (1 of 3)

- Estimate nested logit model

```
. xtreg M_ls princ M_lsjh M_lshg horsepower fuel width height domestic year country2-country5, fe
```

```
Fixed-effects (within) regression      Number of obs   =   11,483
Group variable: co                    Number of groups =    351

R-sq:                                Obs per group:
    within = 0.9001                    min =          1
    between = 0.7692                   avg =         32.7
    overall = 0.8512                   max =         146

                                F(13,11119)      =   7706.68
                                Prob > F           =    0.0000

corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.0100
```

M_ls	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
princ	-1.171301	.0264398	-44.30	0.000	-1.223127	-1.119474
M_lsjh	.9081198	.0040417	224.69	0.000	.9001973	.9160423
M_lshg	.580436	.0083036	69.90	0.000	.5641596	.5967125

Merger simulation II. (market specification)



Three steps of merger simulation (2 of 3)

mergersim market [if] [in], [market_options] → conduct(#)

```
. mergersim market if year == 1999
```

```
Supply: Bertrand competition  
Demand: Unit demand two-level nested logit
```


```
Demand estimate  
xtreg M_ls princ M_lsjh M_lshg horsepower fuel width height domestic year country2-country5, fe  
Dependent variable: M_ls
```

Parameters

```
alpha = -1.171  
sigma1 = 0.908  
sigma2 = 0.580
```

Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities: unweighted market averages

variable	mean	sd	min	max
M_ejj	-8.527	4.329	-39.684	-2.069
M_ejk	0.855	1.486	0.002	10.354
M_ejl	0.076	0.133	0.000	0.781
M_ejm	0.001	0.002	0.000	0.010



Own-price elasticity

Cross-price elasticities

Merger simulation II. (market specification)



Three steps of merger simulation (2 of 3)

mergersim market [if] [in], [market_options] → conduct(#)

Pre-merger Market Conditions
Unweighted averages by firm

firm code	princ	Marginal costs	Pre-merger Lerner
BMW	0.888	0.784	0.130
Fiat	0.770	0.591	0.278
Ford	0.791	0.694	0.149
Honda	0.663	0.580	0.134
Hyundai	0.562	0.483	0.159
Kia	0.472	0.393	0.185
Mazda	0.695	0.614	0.132
Mercedes	1.035	0.898	0.144
Mitsubishi	0.694	0.613	0.126
Nissan	0.658	0.576	0.142
GM	0.915	0.820	0.123
PSA	0.670	0.561	0.189
Renault	0.684	0.582	0.177
Suzuki	0.448	0.368	0.185
Toyota	0.611	0.529	0.156
VW	0.804	0.701	0.167
Daewoo	0.537	0.457	0.168

Merger simulation III. (merger simulation)



Three steps of merger simulation (3 of 3), unilateral effects

```
mergersim simulate [if] [in], firm(varname) {buyer(#) seller(#) | newfirm(varname)} [simulate_options]  
→ newconduct(#) buyereff(#) sellereff(#) method(fixedpoint | newton)
```

```
. mergersim simulate if year == 1999 , seller(5) buyer(15) detail // Ford merges w GM
```

```
Prices  
Unweighted averages by firm
```

firm code	Pre-merger	Post-merger	Relative change
BMW	0.888	0.890	0.002
Fiat	0.770	0.770	0.001
Ford	0.791	0.820	0.045
Honda	0.663	0.663	0.000
Hyundai	0.562	0.562	0.000
Kia	0.472	0.472	0.000
Mazda	0.695	0.695	0.000
Mercedes	1.035	1.035	0.001
Mitsubishi	0.694	0.694	0.000
Nissan	0.658	0.658	0.000
GM	0.915	0.944	0.041
PSA	0.670	0.670	0.001
Renault	0.684	0.684	0.000
Suzuki	0.448	0.448	0.000
Toyota	0.611	0.611	0.000
VW	0.804	0.806	0.003
Daewoo	0.537	0.537	0.000

Merger simulation III. (merger simulation)



Three steps of merger simulation (3 of 3), unilateral effects with efficiencies

```
mergersim simulate [if] [in], firm(varname) {buyer(#) seller(#) | newfirm(varname)} [simulate_options]  
newconduct(#) buyereff(#) sellereff(#) method(fixedpoint | newton)
```

```
. mergersim simulate if year == 1999, seller(5) buyer(15) buyereff(0.1) sellereff(0.1) detail method(fixedpoint) // Ford merges w GM w eff
```

Prices
Unweighted averages by firm

firm code	Pre-merger	Post-merger	Relative change
BMW	0.888	0.883	-0.005
Fiat	0.770	0.768	-0.002
Ford	0.791	0.767	-0.018
Honda	0.663	0.662	-0.001
Hyundai	0.562	0.562	-0.000
Kia	0.472	0.472	-0.000
Mazda	0.695	0.695	-0.000
Mercedes	1.035	1.024	-0.008
Mitsubishi	0.694	0.693	-0.000
Nissan	0.658	0.658	-0.000
GM	0.915	0.880	-0.026
PSA	0.670	0.669	-0.001
Renault	0.684	0.683	-0.001
Suzuki	0.448	0.448	-0.000
Toyota	0.611	0.610	-0.000
VW	0.804	0.802	-0.003
Daewoo	0.537	0.537	-0.000

Merger simulation III. (merger simulation)



Three steps of merger simulation (3 of 3), unilateral & coordinated effects

```
mergersim simulate [if] [in], firm(varname) {buyer(#) seller(#) | newfirm(varname)} [simulate_options]  
newconduct(#) buyereff(#) sellereff(#) method(fixedpoint | newton)
```

```
. mergersim simulate if year == 1999 , seller(5) buyer(15) newconduct(0.2) detail // Ford merges w GM w coordinated effects
```

```
Prices  
Unweighted averages by firm
```

firm code	Pre-merger	Post-merger	Relative change
BMW	0.888	0.917	0.037
Fiat	0.770	0.793	0.036
Ford	0.791	0.845	0.084
Honda	0.663	0.687	0.039
Hyundai	0.562	0.585	0.046
Kia	0.472	0.495	0.052
Mazda	0.695	0.718	0.037
Mercedes	1.035	1.063	0.033
Mitsubishi	0.694	0.717	0.035
Nissan	0.658	0.682	0.041
GM	0.915	0.970	0.074
PSA	0.670	0.695	0.043
Renault	0.684	0.708	0.042
Suzuki	0.448	0.471	0.054
Toyota	0.611	0.634	0.044
VW	0.804	0.830	0.040
Daewoo	0.537	0.561	0.049

Conclusion



How and when to apply “mergersim”?

- “Mergersim” is easy to apply, estimates are clear
- The “mergersim” Stata program is useful given the followings:
 - The user understands the underlying model
 - The model describes well the competition in the market
 - Sufficient data are available
- To-dos with “mergersim”
 - Use as an initial/additional screen in a more comprehensive merger assessment
 - Run sense-checks of the initial results
- Not to-dos with “mergersim”
 - Use as a single decision tool in merger assessments (Type I error is very problematic)
 - Do not place too much emphasis on results if many assumptions are made
 - Use as a sole predictor of coordinated effects

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